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Comments on Sally V. and W. Thomas Mallison's Paper:
The Naval Practices of Belligerents in World War II:
Legal Criteria and Developments
by
M. W.Janis *
The London Protocol and the Judgment at Nuremberg:
A Commentary on Mallison
It is with some trepidation that I venture to comment on Sally and Tom
Mallison's "The Naval Practices ofBelligerents in World War II: Legal Criteria
and Developments.,,1 I have known Sally and Tom since the early 1970's when
I was a very junior naval officer on study leave here at the Naval War College
from my teaching post at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. I have
the greatest respect for their fine book, Studies in the LAw of Naval Warfare:
Submarines in General and Limited War, which is one of the volumes in the
distinguished "Blue Book" series published by the Naval War College.2 That
book and today's paper by the Mallisons raise some of the same fundamental
questions, questions at the very heart of the relationship be~een international
law and military activities.
In the essay on "Neutrality" that I wrote for Admiral Robertson for his
Commentary on The Commander's Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operationi, I
discuss my belief that international law is not a single system of legal rules and
legal procedure, but really constitutes many such systems: some "harder" and
some "softer. ,,4 In that essay I argue that it is a mistake to think about the laws
of neutrality as a form of hard law, rather "the rules respecting neutrality ...
will be rules tailor-made to fit particular conflicts and will neither be norms of
general specificity nor will they be enforced by a coercive apparatus comparable
to that available for "harder" forms of international law. ,,5 In general, it is, I
think, unrealistic to assume that all international law is of the same certainty or
of the same legally binding effect.
It was John Austin, the English legal positivist, who wrote in 1832:
[T]hat the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive
law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its
author...• [T]he law obtaining between nations is law (improperly so called) set
by general opinion. The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions:
by fear on the part of nations or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking
general hostility, and incurring itslrobable evils, in case they shall violate maxims
generally received and respected.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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As early as 1836, Henry Wheaton, the American author of the first English
language textbook on international law, was already having to cope with Austin's
critique ofinternationallaw as being merely a form ofmorality? Although some
are satisfied as to the law-like quality of international law, others are doubtful.
The English legal philosopher, H.L.A. Hart, for example, in a modem reformulation oflegal positivism, argues that international law is more like primitive
law than like municipal law because international law lacks "the formal structure
of ••. a legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction and officially organized
sanctions. ,,8
However, neither Austin's nor Hart's nor most other general jurisprudential
characterizations of international law pay particular attention to the diversity of
international law. That is, most discussions of the problems of the certainty and
efficacy of international law assume that there is a system, uncertain and
ineffective though it may be, of international law and suppose that there is
something like a single general integrated, if not hierarchical, international legal
process. Reality is otherwise.
Different sorts of international law vary along what might be called a
"structural spectrum," there being "a great variety ofinternationallegal systems,
some more structured than others.,,9 In some ofits forms, for example, the system
regulating nuclear weapons, international law may be so unstructured in terms
of both rule-specificity and rule-enforcement as to be, at best, a kind of Hart's
so-called "primitive law" .10 In some other ofits manifestations, for example, the
systems of European Economic Law Community and of European Human
Rights Law, international law may be so well-structured in terms of rulespecificity and rule-enforcement as to be virtually as "hard" as any ordinary
domestic lawY
Given the diversity ofinternational legal systems, we should assume that there
will be differences in the certainty of their rules and the efficacy of their
enforcement processes. In analyzing the relationships between law and society,
Max Weber, at the tum of the century, defined "law" as "an order system
endowed with certain specific guaranties of the probability of its empirical
validity.,,12 Weber's necessary "guarantees" for law are more sophisticated than
Austin's necessary "sovereigns" for law. Weber wrote of a "coercive apparatus,
i.e., that there are one or more persons whose special task it is to hold themselves
ready to apply specially provided means of coercion (legal coercion) for the
purpose of norm enforcement." The coercive apparatus "may use psychological
as well as physical means of coercion and may operate directly or indirectly
. the partICIpants
. .
. t he system. ,,13 W eber' s conceptual framework·IS, I
agamst
m
submit, a more useful and realistic way to understand the nature and diversity
of international law than the theories provided by Austin and Hart.
In general, I feel that the law relating to naval attacks on merchant shipping
in World War II was, at best, a sort of very "soft" international law. As a focus
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for my comments on the Mallisons' paper, let me mosdy discuss their treatment
ofthe Nuremberg Tribunal. Let me begin by noting an oversight in their original
paper, i.e., the assertion that "there was only one case before the Tribunal direcdy
involving law of naval warfare, i.e., the individual case ofAdmiral Doenitz. 14 In
reality, the Tribunal judged not only Karl Doenitz for violations of the laws of
naval warfare,15 but also, on like charges, Admiral Eric Raeder, the commander
of the German Navy between 1928 and 1943.16 The charges and the findings
of the Court were not dissimilar between the two. 17
The trial of the two German admirals raised in a specific context two
jurisprudential questions that had and still have broad public appeal. The first is
how definite were and are the rules of international law relating to submarine
attacks on merchant shipping? The second is how should such rules have been
and be enforced? At the time of their trial, Doenitz and Raeder received
considerable support in Western public opinion for their position that the crimes
of which they were accused were neither properly defined nor were they
properly prosecuted. Airey Neave, the brilliant English lawyer who followed a
distinguished war service with service on the British legal team at Nuremberg
and who, so many years later, was tragically assassinated while trying to sort out
the troubles in Northern Ireland, wrote in his insightful account of Nuremberg
how he believed that it was the sympathy of Western public opinion that saved
Doenitz and Raeder from the gallows to which the German generals, Keitel and
JodI, were condemned. IS Even as late as 1976, two Americans edited a book
filled with more than one hundred testimonials, mosdy by Western military
officers, protesting the Nuremberg trial ofDoenitz. 19 Neave himself, knowing
both the men and their war records in great detail, surmised that "[a]llied naval
officers, accustomed to the traditions of their service, may not have known the
true Karl Doenitz.... They did not see him as a political admiral but that is
what he was. ,,20
The Mallisons are critical of the Nurembergjudgment, too, especially with
the way in which the Court defined the term "merchant vessels" in the applicable
international convention, the 1936 London Protoco1. 21 In the context of their
critique of the interpretation of the London Protocol, the Mallisons are especially
critical of Robert W. Tucker's analysis of the Protocol in another of the fine
Blue Books, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea.22 The Mallisons feel that
Tucker was wrong when he wrote that belligerents in the Pacific War did not
"observe the obligations laid down by the 1936 London Protocol.,,23 The
Mallisons argue that Tucker committed a "plain meaning" fallacy and that
Tucker should have understood that the text of the Protocol was "normatively
ambiguous. ,,24 Although I am sympathetic with what I would perceive to be
the Mallison's "bottom line," I must say that I think they are wrong and Tucker
right about whether or not the Protocol was violated.
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As I see it, the Mallisons, "bottom line" is the worthy goal ofpreserving some
validity for an international law norm even when the efficacy of that norm has
been called into serious question by considerable contrary state practice. As an
international lawyer, I applaud their mission. Furthermore, I understand its
relevance given the relationship between the 1936 Protocol and the 1939-1945
War. I think that the Mallisons err, however, in attempting to save the norm
about submariners' duty to merchant vessels by their restrictive definition of
"merchant ships.,,25 The principal proof in their argument is a paragraph from
the Report of the Committee ofJurists of April 3, 1930, a paragraph that I think
is circular and unhelpful if it means what the Mallisons use it to say.26 If
"participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose her right to
the immunities of a merchant vessel" leaves out merchant ships participating in
the armed struggle and if in practice virtually every possible merchant ship is a
participant in the armed struggle, then the Protocol is saved from the challenge
of inefficacy only by being robbed of its substance.
Theirs is an argument and a result propounded as long ago as March 5, 1946,
by the able counsel for Admiral Doenitz, the German naval lawyer, Otto
Kranzbuehler. In the proceedings before the Nuremberg Court, Kranzbuehler
submitted, and submitted successfully, that he should be permitted to put
interrogatories to Admiral Nimitz about u.s. submarine operations in the
Pacific:
I in no way wish to prove or even to maintain that the American Admiralty in its
U-boat warfare against Japan broke international law. On the contrary, I am of
the opinion that it acted stricdy in accordance with international law....
My point is that, because of the order to merchant vessels to offer resistance, the
London Agreement is no longer applicable to such merchant men; further, that
it was not applicable in declared operational zones in which a general warning
had been given to all vessels, thus making an individual warning unnecessary
27
before the attack.

While I understand the nature of the Mallisons' argument about limiting the
definitional reach of the term "merchant shipping," I cannot myself see why the
argument is necessary or even particularly useful. What is wrong with saying, as
Tucker did, that the London Protocol of 1936 established rules and that the
belligerents in World War II violated those rules? From my perspective this is
the statement that is honesdy reflective of the realities of the "soft" international
law then regulating activities like submarine attacks on merchant shipping. And
what is wrong with deciding, as the Nuremberg judges did, that Doenitz and
Raeder were guilty of violating the 1936 London Protocol, but then choosing
·hh
·28
not to purus
t em fcor It.

108

Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping

The judgment distinguished between attacks on British merchant vessels and
29
those on neutrals. The judges rejected the notion about operational zones
3o
saying that "the Protocol made no exception" for them. Though this is a
holding that the Mallisons call "unreasonable and unworkable,,,31 it seems to
me to be consistent with the Protocol. Frankly, I see none of the ambiguity that
the Mallisons see. To me it is simply a case of "soft" international law, an
aspirationallaw that has trouble being effectively applied.
I, too, am much more sympathetic than the Mallisons with the sentence of
the Court. The Mallisons seem to imply that they feel that, despite its protestations, the Court did take Doenitz' submarine activities into account when it
32
sentenced him to ten years of prison. Looking at the sentences for others,
including Raeder, the Doenitz sentence does not seem to me to be extreme. I
think it likely that the submarine program did not finally weigh against Doenitz.
Furthermore, the reasons why the Court did not punish Doenitz for his
violations of the 1936 London Protocol make sense, especially in light of the
strategy adopted by Doenitz's lawyer. KranzbuehIer, after all, had argued that
U.S. Pacific submarine operations were so similar to German Atlantic operations
that neither the U.S. nor Germany were violating international law• The answer
preferred by the Court was that the London Protocol was violated but that the
violation was not reason enough to punish the Admiral.
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